Many years ago, there was ablogger that described the biggest problem with Halacha is our inability to update it based on reality. He described it as a building where we keep adding layers when lower ones make issues instead of going back down to the foundation and reconstructing it.
Anyone who has a scientific mind has already pondered this issue, that halacha is unfalsifiable and unfixable due to the fact that we cannot argue with chazal based on facts.
My answer is this: While I would not agree that halacha is sociological rather than metaphysical, God did not want us to update it independently due to sociological issues. There are many people who tried to update halacha (probably the most recent is David Bar Hayyim of Machon Shilo) but it never catches on and the result is there are two torot in Israel. Rather, Hashem wants there to be an authoritative group responsible for updating that will be accepted by all of Israel. In my opinion, should the Sanhedrin be reinstated, the very first thing they would do is update hilchot kashrut and niddah and so on. It is only due to the tremendous machloket and lack of legislative power we are unable to do so today, and we should not even try.
I agree that most end up as a chumra, but there are some kulos as well like you mentioned with kli shlishi and lice on shabbos, but what about the חזקות and אומדנות of chazal such as טב למיתב טן דו, אין אשה מעיזה פניה בפני בעלה, which the poskim refused to update? (I'm would also recommend rejetissoning every chazakah in choshen mishpat based on pew research surveys). Additionally, in the areas of maros and vestos there are many scientific errors (for heaven's sake, they even pisrepresented basic female anatomy).
And just to point out, the oft debated idea about נשים דעתן קלות and how to apply to a yoetzet halacha is also a halachic justification for the issur yichud two women. Ask anyone with half a mind and it's very clear that men's attitude to sexuality is far more loose than women, generally speaking, and this logic makes no sense.
where he readily admits that most of the "chazokos, rov's", and other realities which form the basis of large sections of Halacha were only arrived at through some sort of scientific inquiry and were not inherently "Torah" until canonized by the Mishna and Talmud.
But he fails to take the obvious next step of updating the Halacha when necessary.
That's because נשים דעתן קלות means being susceptible to seduction. As anyone who isn't ridiculously politically correct would agree is the case.
And as far as chazakos, they undermine your case, because they are clearly NOT meant to be factual, in fact, they are what we call legal assumptions or fictions. As anyone who has learnt chazakos knows.
Its a clear fact that women are more selective and less likely to get lured in easily.
Chazakos are the furthest thing from legal fiction. They may not be absolute rules about what definitely happened, but they are analyses of general patterns to establish what the default assumption is in a specific case. So if the analysis is flawed the chazakah can be wrong.
We are clearly referring to 2 differnet kinds of chazaka. Chezkas kashrus is a din how to treat a safek, and is not a kind of verification in any way. Indeed, the gemara darshens the concept from a passuk (Chullin 11). The kind of chazaka I was referring to are אומדנות, which are chazals evaluation of what tends to happen. If their evaluation is flawed, they can potentially be wrong. Heck, almost the enitre gittan and bava basra are evaluations of what people normally do and mean.
We clearly have a different understanding of the exact scenario and perspective where נשים דעתן קלות is relevant. I was focusing on one aspect of female psychology, while you were focusing on another. I admit that I don't know I am right, so I'll concede the point.
If you understand halacha to be metaphysical, than whatever sociological reasons you may have to not update halacha should be insufficient, as it is 'really' assur/muttar and to say otherwise is simply wrong.
Btw, it's always lekula we don't update. Most yeshivish people will not rely on kli shlishi if it's really hot. All the cases you quoted are without exception wanting to be updated lekula. We will not permit bliyos despite them not actually chemically exmutter. Same with treyfos, we will consider them treyf despite the metzius being it's muttsr. Please find an example where the science says it's assur but halacha says it's muttar where we aren't choshesh (excluding the few cases where chazal say so, such as lice, which are debated in the poskim).
The reason the gemara gives for why worms in fruit are mutter isn't correct scientifically. Even though there are other reasons in chazal why they're mutter (in sifri) the modern day poskim asser all tolaim against the gemara according to science.
>Please find an example where the science says it's assur but halacha says it's muttar
The need to have a consistent calendar can result in two friends, born a day apart (last day of Adar I and first day of Adar II) to have their bar mitzvos one month apart, with the younger boy preceding the older boy. Now, we permit young boys to get an aliya on Simchas Torah, so perhaps this anomaly isn't as groundbreaking as one might imagine, but if we were to enter contract law or anything else where one needs to be a legal adult, science would say that the inversion of seniority is contrary to reality.
You explain it according to the halacha, but that doesn't make it real.
If a kohen marries a divorcee, we force him to divorce. But if a kohen marries a gentile, we do not force him to divorce. Why is this the case? Because there is חלות שם קידושין (recognized halachic marriage) when the kohen marries a divorcee, but it's a prohibited marriage, so we force a גט. But when a kohen marries a non-Jew, the marriage is not חל (it's not recognized, just like gay marriage or marriage to a dog or a table or a dead person isn't recognized) and so no divorce is necessary. The same is true if a man gives his mother or daughter כסף קידושין...there's no need for a divorce because there is no effective marriage.
All of these sorts of halachic ideas, whether in regard to if a marriage or a succah is considered legitimate are merely halachic constructs. In other words, they don't exist outside of halacha. A marriage, in halacha, is only recognized if it is, and if it is not, social convention isn't enough.
I'd like to contrast that with how old someone is, and even stronger than that, how old someone is relative to another person. One cannot say that Adam is older than Brian if Brian is older than Adam. It's a non-negotiable reality of the universe. There's a celestial timestamp, and it's only for the sake of the preservation of the calendar system that such a wacky violation of math is accepted. A conflict arose and the halacha prioritized the calendar over math.
There is an example in מסכת סוכה of an eruv that is questionable, and deemed invalid. But this technical deficiency does not invalidate said construction for the purposes of a succah, and the talmud asks how this could be..."is it possible," the gemara asks incredulously, "that this could be a valid succah but you aren't permitted to walk on Shabbos four amos in this succah holding an item?" The conclusion is that on Shabbos of Succos, we accept this as a valid eruv, but not for the rest of the year.
The difference between these situations and the calendar, as I see it, is that an eruv and a succah and a marriage and a divorce are all strictly halachic entities. They don't exist outside of the halachic framework. But time exists outside of halacha. Math is real outside of halacha. And so to say that halacha claims that the younger boy is older than the older boy is a paradoxical assertion that I see as halacha conflicting with reality, in a way that halacha is not confronting reality in the examples of the kohen or the eruv above, because marriages and eruvin do not exist in reality, but are merely halachic constructs.
I'm sorry, but older in a halachic sense simply is not based on howany days ago you were born, rather how.mNy years you lived, with a year being defined with the halachic year, so objectively the younger one is older from a halachic perspective (it's not even a legal fiction, merely a set of principles)
It seems that you are asserting that psak has the power to establish the halacha even when it's based on incorrect premises. Isn't this the classic case of בית דין שטעו?
And the tshuvos I referenced from the Rashba and the Maadanei Yom Tov (and in the famous dispute of the pachad yitzchak) they are very clear that it's because we trust chazal to be right, not because it doesn't matter.
הוריות א ד ב"ד שהורו וידע יודע אחד מהן שטעו או אחד מהתלמידים וראוי להוראה והלך ועשה על פיהן חייב שלא עשה על פי בית דין. It's debatable whether we can be considered ראוי להוראה with regard to factual questions, but at least the rishonim and acharonim would seem to fit this category as chazal don't have the complete authority of Sanhedrin after Sanhedrin disbanded.
Additionally, on a factual question who's to say the concept of psak even exists when we know they were mistaken? Its like the Mishnah in yevamos where beis din is matir an ishah and her husband walks into beis din, where we don't allow her to get remarried until beis din intervenes, and if she knew about it she would be chayav (which is why she always is because she should have done her research).
Another interesting post. I notice a few interesting posts on your substack, I hope you don’t mind if I make some comments on each. Thanks again. Now for my response to this one.
"Rav Dessler offers a novel solution, but it's very difficult to accept. He claims that even when they gave their reasoning based on theןr scientific understanding, there are many reasons, and they knew the halacha b'mesorah, so although they may have been mistaken in the science, the halacha remains the same."
I would suggest that Rav Dessler's solution is not really novel, but is a basic realization that emerges from prolonged study of Gemara. It's clear that in many cases, the Amoraim didn't have a mesorah on the reasoning for the Mishnaic halacha, which is why they argue at length about the reasoning. One simple example out of hundreds is the first two daf of Beitzah, in which the Amoraim suggest at least four different possible reasons for the halacha that an egg is assur on Yom Tov, and discuss the various pros and cons of the reasons extensively. It's also clear that in many cases, even when the Gemara pasken like a certain reason, it still takes other possible reasons into account. One example is in the discussion on daf 18a in Beitzah, in the Maharshah's comments to Rashi and the Pnei Yehoshua, in which they explain that the Gemara always understood that there is an underlying issue of תיקון מנה when purifying a vessel on Yom Tov, but is nevertheless proposing other, more solid rationales for the prohibition.
One can ask, if this is the case, how can we ever use the reasons given in the Gemara, or our own reasoning, to pasken various cases in halacha in which those reasons would affect the outcome? Maybe our reason is incorrect? After all, we never know for sure? And the answer is that this is how halacha works. אין לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות. The Torah expects us to use our reasoning skills to pasken. However, it does not expect us to use our reasoning skills to *contradict* halachos that we received במסורה.
Therefore, in regards to the leniency of killing lice on Shabbos in which the Gemara gives a rationale that lice don't procreate, even if that reason is scientifically incorrect, it doesn't mean the halacha is incorrect or should be “updated”. I will offer two further rationales for why this halacha should not be “updated”.
1.Since the Torah was given to people without modern instruments, it is not reasonable to suppose that it would have required modern instruments to pasken, and that such halachos should change based on the revelations of modern instruments.
2. Moreover, when one contemplates the reason the Gemara gives, it begs for further explanation. Why would the lack of procreation mean that it is not considered נטילת נשמה? The Gemara says this is derived from אילים. But why would “procreation” be the defining feature of אילים for the purpose of melacha, rather than being, say, a big shaggy creature with four legs and two eyes? I think the obvious pshat is that lack of procreation means the creature is not an independent creature, but part of a person’s sweat (and the Rishonim use the words “אלא נולד מן הזיעה”). This can be understood as an absolute (incorrect) physical reality (and I would agree that the Amoraim probably truly believed this- even though in the Gemara there is a discussion if it really true), but at the same time it can also be understood as a halachic category, that the lice are considered part of a person’s sweat, and not an independent creature that שחיטה would apply to- and this is the category that matters more than the scientific one, and would not necessarily change based on modern scientific revelations.
However, none of this means that halacha is never updated. Indeed, there are hundreds, probably thousands of examples in which halacha was updated to align with contemporary circumstances, familiar to anybody who has studied halacha.
Lets talk about some other examples which are clearly dependent on the scientific reasoning. This includes the ancient belief that worms in fish originate from the fish's body, that babies born in the eighth month cannot survive, that there are two ducts in the male organ one for urine one for semen with a thin membrane between them that can burst, that a lactating woman's milk draws on the same resources as menstrual flow, the kinds of interruptions which can affect a womans period, or even the basic structure of female anatomy, whole lists of medical halachos on shabbos, and what about metzitzah by a bris (which was thought to be necessary to avoid infection), large sections of hilchos bliyos, most of the halachos of chimmutz etc. etc. etc. Do you seriously think that the detailed discussions in the gemara and the rishonim are not seriously attempting to ascertain the scientific reality and determine the halacha accordingly?
Sure, I think most of those cases fit in that paradigm. (Not all of them though.) For example, worms in fish- this is a halachic category and is related to insects born in fruit and in the water, whether they are פורש or not. It is not just a bare scientific question that that tangentially relates to halacha.
A lactating woman's milk draws on the same resources as menstrual flow- this is even easier because it is based on basic physical observation, that there is a correlation between lactation and menstruation. Even if they were wrong about the scientific mechanism, the halacha as relates to סילוק דם can still be correct. In Bechoros, it is discussing about a צריכותא in drashos, which doesn’t affect the halacha in the first place.
Babies born in the eighth month cannot survive is almost certainly based on actual observation and was not a belief unique to the Rabbis. I don’t think that all these cultures saw such babies commonly survive and just ignored that. This has nothing to do with paradigms of rationalism and empiricism, if such babies commonly survived, there wouldn’t have been such a belief.
Hilchos bliyos and chametz easily fit into this paradigm, more than everything else you mentioned. I think this is what the Rambam means in Hilchos chametz- אפילו לש קמח ארז וכיוצא בו ברותחין וכסהו בבגדים עד שנתפח כמו בצק שהחמיץ הרי זה מותר באכילה שאין זה חמוץ אלא סרחון. As for Bliyos, their pots were much more porous than ours and were certainly boleyah even without heat (which leads to the question, why aren’t these halachos updated for modern pots? I have heard that Rav Belsky used this as a סניף להקל. I think we will see more of this as time passes), and so is food. This is why the halacha of the Gemara is having a non-Jew test the taste. Because it worked. You can experiment yourself on food and easily confirm this. But the detailed requirements of heat and especially Kli Rishon are definitely halachic categories.
“Do you seriously think that the detailed discussions in the gemara and the rishonim are not seriously attempting to ascertain the scientific reality and determine the halacha accordingly?”
It doesn’t even remotely look like that from studying halacha. Yes, there was some empirical observation, and they knew how to look at things empirically when they felt necessary (I have a short list of such cases on one of my IM posts), but the vast majority is discussions of halachic categories, and that is what matters in halacha.
Thanks for the comments! I haven't yet had a chance to respond to your comments on the other post or to this one I will try to get to it soon. Keep them coming!
We don't get such an impression from any reading of chazal themselves. They used logic, science, and other methods and were very transparent about their conclusions. Also, 'hidden reasons' seems difficult to imagine what they would be in most cases, unless you allow for kabbalistic reasons, which chazal clearly did not engage in, and even according to the modern charedi view that they did, it's still insufficeint grounds for a halachic ruling,
Isn’t saying that “chazal were very transparent” kind of begging the question since the claim at issue is whether they didn’t explain everything?
When you say that “hidden reasons” are hard to imagine. What do you mean? I usually think that imagination is not that difficult. People imagine lots of interesting things.
When you say kabbalistic reasons would be insufficient grounds according to modern charedi views, couldn’t a Rav Dessler proponent respond that it is insufficient by itself to establish a ruling but not insufficient to maintain a ruling once the primary reason fell away?
Also dont recorded chazal often says very little as to their actual intention behind reasoning as is evident by numerous explanations on Chazal explaining the deeper meanings of chazal? Even in Halacha, each source is abridged and needs a lot more to explain tonal full understanding. When the Mishima brurah explains the meaning of a ramma, he’s saying the ramma meant that but didn’t say it in a lot of words. The Gemara was intentionally left confusing according to some in order to allow for discussion and learning. So the idea of hidden reasons doesn’t seem foreign to me at all.
No, it's an empirical fact that halacha was established through a process of reasoning and debate, and we never find someone saying the halacha is x מטעם כמוס עמדי. Therefore, to postulate an entire underworld or reasoning which is completely absent from dialogue is highly contentious or even conspiratorial. It simply doesn't reflect what we do know, and it should be immediately striking as weak apologetics, and the direct answer is that they simply considered the reason they explicitly stated to be valid, as they were limited by the science of their times.
When I read a mishna, I can more often than not predict the kind of explanation the gemara will give, and even moreso for a halacha in the gemara one who's familiar with the process can usually predict how the rishonim will explain it. For the most part halacha is not a mysterious realm constantly filled with esoteric revelations. It might be cryptic for the moderm reader who is used to a particular style of fleshing out discussions, but within it's own framework it's largely comprehensible. There simply no room for a whole new dimension.
The idea that kabbala is insufficient grounds for halacha is in itself a halachic principle. I don't see why mantaining the status quo would be any different.
I’m surprised with your ability to predict so well. Have you not spent weeks in yeshiva trying to understand a R Chaim or Ketzos and having many different possibilities as to the meaning behind those words?
So I guess I’m not sure why you think there isn’t a lot of hidden reasons behind chazal if you agree that one sentence of an acharon can have a much deeper reasoning and multiple ways of interpreting it. I view that as “hidden” reasons that we wouldn’t necessarily understand by looking at the one sentence explanation as to why something is assur.
They write in many places אם קבלה הוא נקבל. They also edited the Talmud to get to a specific conclusion in a way that feels the conclusion is predetermined. (At least that's what Talmid academic scholars say).
If I'm understanding you correctly, you believe that the most plausible approach of all is that really halacha got it wrong, only that no rabbis were ever bold/aware enough to say so?
I strongly disagree with you, but I'll just interject now that Rav Dessler's approach is famously found already in the writings of the Ramchal, only when he said it had little to do with resolving the contradiction, rather as an innate and internal understanding of agados chazal in general. It so happens to answer the question beautifully. But this is obviously part a longer discussion which would probably get to the roots of our differences (especially in how we'd probably view the different movements of Jewish history).
The Ramchal (I'm assuming you are referring to מאמר על ההגדות) does not say anything regarding halachic statements, he only addresses aggodos chazal and introduces the concepts of mashal u'mlitzah as appropriate for those contexts.
Of course if you come with an a priori that the mesorah is justified one can find all kinds of answers (such as rav dessler's who to an outsider clearly seems like weak apologetics, although it fits well with the quasi-chassidic narratvie throughout his writings). I am approaching it as a historical question, and I think the sharp dichotomy I presented leads us pretty strongly to the conclusion I drew. (See my post on deconstruction)
elsewhere he talks about halachic statements as well; see for example adir bamarom pg. 236.
but this comment is a big one. as you pointed out in the previous post, the first question is, what is the starting point? am i an atheist until judaism is proven, or am i reasonable to assume judaism is true until you disprove it. if you start with the former, we can probably still get there eventually but it will take much longer, but either way you can grant me the freedom that if i can use a certain theory of explaining the world from a source based ontological standpoint within judaism which answers the questions of science, the fact that to an outsider (who is ignorant of what he is arguing against in the first place) it may seem strange is hardly my problem.
for example, the reb dessler (ramchal) approach, if i can assert some pretty based jewish axioms from early and numerous sources with ontologically sound reasoning, and from those reasonable axioms the questions of science are answered by the bye, while this won't positively prove any of judaism's claims, it will ease up the tension from those questions which put judaism on trial to begin with.
case in point: assuming there is a God, the abrahamic monotheistic type, and we delve into the character of what such a God would entail did He exist, we would (pretty quickly- we can work it out separately) conclude that the One who created everything ex-nihilo is necessary for its constant maintenance. this has been made extra famous in the yeshiva world by the nefesh hachaim's comparison between a creation by God (i.e. ex-nihilo) and a carpenter's creation (ex-materia) that after the carpenter leaves the scene, the building still stands. but it's pretty much the standard approach throughout both jewish works and christian and muslim theologians. in jewish works, the rambam, ramban, ralbag, rav chisdai crescas, the ikkarim and of course the arizal and anyone after him all either alude to this or say it straight out. in non-jewish works, aquinas was probably the most famous to discuss this, but plotinus, augustine, avicenna, ansalem, avveroes and al farabi pretty much all converge on this topic (although technically al farabi and avveroes can be misconstrued, the best reading is as we said above). i don't know if there are any religious contestors to this idea until pretty recently (by people who know little about ontology), including reb saadia gaon who has been quoted wrongly (by those same poeple) as disagreeing; while he doesn't ever actually espouse this view super clearly, there's definitely nothing that i know of that he says which diverges from this notion. the only people who clearly argued were aristotle and aristotilean die-hards (or other later pantheists like spinoza) who believed the universe existed forever as a necessary manifestation of God's perfection, but those who believe in creation pretty much agree on this. if i ever get down to turning this into a book or at least a series of posts, i'll devote a chapter on this and its sources and ensuing debates. but point is that all religious philosopher believers seem to agree on this point -- and the reason is obvious; nothing "needs" to be if it wasn't aways.
now given that this is the case, science as we know it, the system of how physicality works, is really nothing more than the workings of an illusion of permanence. if you think you can swallow the previous notion and not this, think again; this is basically a definitional result of that. this second step makes a lot of modern believers (creationists in whatever form you wish that to mean, including a 14 billion yr old version) very uncomfortable because it sounds like we're saying science isn't real (which is kinda true!) but at the same time, that is absolutely *not* what we're saying. in fact, if you follow this thought process through, all it does is change what we mean when we talk about science. from this perspective, science is the workings of a system within the framework of a world that was created, which is, in a sense, not the way it *really* works. acc. to this worldview, science isn't a necessary entity and the laws can be changed by Him at any moment, but! He *did* create laws and *doesn't* change them, חק נתן ולא יעבור. so in that sense science is very real and we can swear by it and be proud of ourselves as mankind for discovering etc. only that this into can really do wonders to begin the process of explaining the contradiction of science and the ancient way of understanding; there are in fact two simultaneous realities at play and they, in a sense, don't work together.
there is a whole lot more to this thesis, even in just the legwork process, such as understanding what the ancients were doing (which probably needs further legwork in it's own right especially to a generation which thinks they were a bunch of foolish superstitious ignoramuses trying to understand things out of nothing) but this is an excellent place to start imo.
looking forward to your response, sorry for my delay
I am preparing a series of posts on theistic and atheistic arguments, and I plan on addressing these points with a decent amount of thoroughness, but for the time being my posts will focus more on either the psychology of frum belief or theological and historical analyses of Judaism, as I want to set the tone of this blog to be a uniquely Jewish discussion and not a general discussion of theism which includes many Christian and Muslim sources as well.
With regard to your point about an outsider, I am currently at the point that I view Judaism as an outsider but I am intimately aware of the inside view as well. There are many scholars as well who are well aware of frum theology who do not accept the claims. With regard to Rav desslers claim, I find it as logical as the example I discussed in earlier post about the assumption of Mary, that within a Christian paradigm it's very logical but as an outsider who does not a priori except the assumptions of Catholicism *and* view his theological speculations (?) as having a privilege status about the ontological nature of the universe of the claim itself is rather weak.
>>>when discussing the issue of chazal and science, most rishonim and acharonim have been of the opinion that chazal used the contemporary science available to them, but had no special knowledge of the 'secrets of the torah' which gave them superior knowledge than the Greeks or contemporary science.
While it might be of no use to comment on while in the discussion, I don't think it's irrelevant. You write that "chazal use the science available to them," but the rabbis of today do not. They promote religious law and life with complete disregard to science, a single word that can perhaps be best abbreviated as "the best method of pursuing truth." Science, with its open debate, peer review and double-blind methods, is designed to circumvent the mind traps that humans are so apt to fall into, and it shows us there are no good reasons to presume religion to be true. Those who promote religion, with the rabbis at the front and chazal in their minds and their books, are ignoring these critical concerns.
For sure, Judaism is less fake than Christianity, so kudos to Ramban in Barcelona, but that's only to say that more things have to have been made up for Christianity to be true. Sort of like Sam Harris' comments about how Mormonism is objectively more ridiculous than mainstream Christianity. But where is the consideration of Orthodoxy and its members that they are praying to thin air, or even an address to the potential that they might be?
If the idea that there's a metaphysical reality is proposed without evidence, it can similarly be rejected without evidence.
This then becomes a more mature version of "well, my daddy can beat you up" vs "no, my daddy can beat YOU up!" although not that much mature.
It certainly seems that you think this comment is way more profound than it really is. You'd never think to say, "I may not have any evidence that there's a monster under my bed, but that's only in physical reality. Metaphysically, though, we know he's there and Rambam agrees with me."
Do you not see how this amounts to special pleading?
The problem is that mysticism has been rediscovered thousands of times by thousands of religions. And they all have relatively similar paths how to achieve a mystical experience. There is evidence if you want to try it out. You have never even attempted to. Such overwhelming agreement of a supposed imaginary realm implies it's real . The denier of mysticism here is the one putting his fingers in his ears and yelling "lalala I can't hear you".
I don't see that as a problem any more than astrology having played a role in so many cultures, but we are confident to reject it completely today. So many cultures studied the relative and supposed "movements" of the stars, and the movement of the planets against the stars, and named constellations after they fabricated constellations. Then they explained how these bodies possess and exert special powers over those born at different times of years when each contrived group of stars rise first in the morning of that month.
Does this make astrology true? There is bad evidence that it's true, because the lady down the block is a Pisces and she got divorced and her husband was a Libra...big surprise, right?
>>>You have never even attempted to.
Have you attempted to rid yourself of sin by visiting the Zoroastrian fire temple? Have you spent even 5 minutes of your life worrying about how your actions have not comported with what the Hadith demands of you? Or do you not even know Sura 15 from Sura 23? You likely don't give a damn and never will because it's just stupidity made up thousands of years ago by gullible people who didn't know that disease came from germs. They thought it came from sin. How silly of them.
I won't even bother asking you if you've attempted to get audited by a Scientologist officer, to see if you are fit to join the Sea Org. Tom Cruise does his own stunts and John Travolta is a very good dancer...but are you saying they're just so stupid as to think that this nonsense could be real?! Obviously there's something there...no?
>>>Such overwhelming agreement of a supposed imaginary realm implies it's real.
There are 1,800,000,000 Muslims and 1,300,000,000 Catholics. Please let me know when you convert to either one because of the overwhelming agreement of these "supposedly imaginary" deities and his rules and regulations, and then explain why you didn't convert to the other one, please.
It seems that the only wise thing to do is deny mysticism, for embracing it brings you no closer to the truth without something else, and as we don't have anything else, all you have is the mysticism. So if you prefer sitting on rugs and humming instead of watching hockey, fine by me. But please don't make assertions without evidence and ask anyone to respect your silly ideas. As Hitchens had iterated so succinctly, I respect you too much to respect your silly ideas.
If you want to go the Dawkins Harris route and compare God to monsters under the bed and flying spaghetti sauce teapots, be my guest. The fact that you don't understand something doesn't make it less profound. You should try orchos tzadikim, moreh or even plato and Aquinas before dismissing them entirely with your "I've never seen them (I imagine you didn't put in quite the effort they did) so they don't exist attitude".
You probably think these are good arguments for your position, but they are not. To suggest that someone who asks for evidence of god should read ארחות צדיקים is to say that you have no good reasons AND you are accusing the antagonist is the discussion (me, among others) of being arrogant and ignorant.
You are an atheist in regard to all the thousands of gods you don't believe in, and you likely spend no time worrying about all the punishments and hells and damnation that these gods promise you for your lack of obedience, and the response to you from priests and shamans of these silly, made-up religions shouldn't be, "you think my eagle god don't exist and you mock their teachings, but only because you haven't studied enough. Go and learn about Nanu the raven and Mohklat the bear and you will be humbled."
Before making any arguments for Judaism, take the argument and change "Hashem" to "Eagle God" and change "Moses" to "Leetu the Ancient" and change "Rabbi Dessler" to "Junkta the wise elder" and see if these arguments would be convincing to you. If not, then your argument isn't a good one.
"(There are contemporary places that have tried to update Halacha, such as Machon Shilo and Machon Hadar. But nobody takes them seriously and eats in their house and davens in their shuls.)"
I don't know what Machon Hadar is but you are mistaken regarding Machon Shilo. Machon Shilo does not update Halacha. It attempts revive Torat Eretz Yisrael in the Land of Israel which was the original halacha which had been perverted and distorted in the exile due to foreign influences and historical and sociological realities. Nothing to do with updating, rather the opposite-returning the original, pristine Torah of Eretz Yisrael. And "(nobody takes them seriously and eats in their house and davens in their shuls.)" I would delete that for your sake.
The brisker method is built on seeing dinim as a reality which is 'chal' and changes the ontological nature of the item in question. For a brisker, halachos aren't simply rules, they are 'things'.
Well there are the classics: Halachic Man and Halachic mind. I highly recommend this essay by his grandson Rabbi Mayer Twersky as an introduction to the whole shebang:
It's lengthy but worth the time. To get to the point, here is one important quote which directly underscores Mr. Furst's astute observation:
"General philosophy deals with basic questions regarding time, space, causality, et cetera—the basic, axiomatic categories of human thought and experience. What is time? Does it independently exist or is it just a descriptive category of measurement—(e.g., is it an hour’s drive?) If time exists, is it homogenous or heterogeneous? Similarly, space, causality and other basic categories invite the same scrutiny.
Religious philosophy investigates the assumptions, axioms and underlying principles of man’s relationship with God. What relationship exists between God who is infinite, eternal and absolutely self-sufficient and man who is finite, mortal and dependent? The nature of religious experience and related issues are scrutinized.
Halachah, according to the Rav, addresses the domains of both religious and general philosophy. First of all, halachic principles can illumine the nature of man’s relationship with God. The second element of the Rav’s thesis is even more remarkable–basic philosophical ideas and religious experiences regarding space, time and causality are objectified within halachah.
Halachah, according to the Rav, is not simply a legal system but also an objectified philosophical system. Within halachah, fundamental philosophical concepts and religious experiences have been translated into halachic norms.12"
Great, nuanced piece
Thanks!
Many years ago, there was ablogger that described the biggest problem with Halacha is our inability to update it based on reality. He described it as a building where we keep adding layers when lower ones make issues instead of going back down to the foundation and reconstructing it.
Anyone who has a scientific mind has already pondered this issue, that halacha is unfalsifiable and unfixable due to the fact that we cannot argue with chazal based on facts.
My answer is this: While I would not agree that halacha is sociological rather than metaphysical, God did not want us to update it independently due to sociological issues. There are many people who tried to update halacha (probably the most recent is David Bar Hayyim of Machon Shilo) but it never catches on and the result is there are two torot in Israel. Rather, Hashem wants there to be an authoritative group responsible for updating that will be accepted by all of Israel. In my opinion, should the Sanhedrin be reinstated, the very first thing they would do is update hilchot kashrut and niddah and so on. It is only due to the tremendous machloket and lack of legislative power we are unable to do so today, and we should not even try.
I agree that most end up as a chumra, but there are some kulos as well like you mentioned with kli shlishi and lice on shabbos, but what about the חזקות and אומדנות of chazal such as טב למיתב טן דו, אין אשה מעיזה פניה בפני בעלה, which the poskim refused to update? (I'm would also recommend rejetissoning every chazakah in choshen mishpat based on pew research surveys). Additionally, in the areas of maros and vestos there are many scientific errors (for heaven's sake, they even pisrepresented basic female anatomy).
And just to point out, the oft debated idea about נשים דעתן קלות and how to apply to a yoetzet halacha is also a halachic justification for the issur yichud two women. Ask anyone with half a mind and it's very clear that men's attitude to sexuality is far more loose than women, generally speaking, and this logic makes no sense.
I agree with your point, but the Rema actually does update the halacha partially.
See Even Haezer 17: 2
https://www.sefaria.org/Shulchan_Arukh%2C_Even_HaEzer.17.2?lang=bi
See also Maharatz Chayes in the Sefer Mavo Hatalmud Chapter 15
https://www.sefaria.org/Mevo_HaTalmud_(Chajes).14.5?lang=bi
where he readily admits that most of the "chazokos, rov's", and other realities which form the basis of large sections of Halacha were only arrived at through some sort of scientific inquiry and were not inherently "Torah" until canonized by the Mishna and Talmud.
But he fails to take the obvious next step of updating the Halacha when necessary.
That's because נשים דעתן קלות means being susceptible to seduction. As anyone who isn't ridiculously politically correct would agree is the case.
And as far as chazakos, they undermine your case, because they are clearly NOT meant to be factual, in fact, they are what we call legal assumptions or fictions. As anyone who has learnt chazakos knows.
Its a clear fact that women are more selective and less likely to get lured in easily.
Chazakos are the furthest thing from legal fiction. They may not be absolute rules about what definitely happened, but they are analyses of general patterns to establish what the default assumption is in a specific case. So if the analysis is flawed the chazakah can be wrong.
We are clearly referring to 2 differnet kinds of chazaka. Chezkas kashrus is a din how to treat a safek, and is not a kind of verification in any way. Indeed, the gemara darshens the concept from a passuk (Chullin 11). The kind of chazaka I was referring to are אומדנות, which are chazals evaluation of what tends to happen. If their evaluation is flawed, they can potentially be wrong. Heck, almost the enitre gittan and bava basra are evaluations of what people normally do and mean.
We clearly have a different understanding of the exact scenario and perspective where נשים דעתן קלות is relevant. I was focusing on one aspect of female psychology, while you were focusing on another. I admit that I don't know I am right, so I'll concede the point.
If you understand halacha to be metaphysical, than whatever sociological reasons you may have to not update halacha should be insufficient, as it is 'really' assur/muttar and to say otherwise is simply wrong.
Btw, it's always lekula we don't update. Most yeshivish people will not rely on kli shlishi if it's really hot. All the cases you quoted are without exception wanting to be updated lekula. We will not permit bliyos despite them not actually chemically exmutter. Same with treyfos, we will consider them treyf despite the metzius being it's muttsr. Please find an example where the science says it's assur but halacha says it's muttar where we aren't choshesh (excluding the few cases where chazal say so, such as lice, which are debated in the poskim).
The reason the gemara gives for why worms in fruit are mutter isn't correct scientifically. Even though there are other reasons in chazal why they're mutter (in sifri) the modern day poskim asser all tolaim against the gemara according to science.
>Please find an example where the science says it's assur but halacha says it's muttar
The need to have a consistent calendar can result in two friends, born a day apart (last day of Adar I and first day of Adar II) to have their bar mitzvos one month apart, with the younger boy preceding the older boy. Now, we permit young boys to get an aliya on Simchas Torah, so perhaps this anomaly isn't as groundbreaking as one might imagine, but if we were to enter contract law or anything else where one needs to be a legal adult, science would say that the inversion of seniority is contrary to reality.
That's not denying the science, it's saying the legal definitions are based on dates, so halachically he's older
You explain it according to the halacha, but that doesn't make it real.
If a kohen marries a divorcee, we force him to divorce. But if a kohen marries a gentile, we do not force him to divorce. Why is this the case? Because there is חלות שם קידושין (recognized halachic marriage) when the kohen marries a divorcee, but it's a prohibited marriage, so we force a גט. But when a kohen marries a non-Jew, the marriage is not חל (it's not recognized, just like gay marriage or marriage to a dog or a table or a dead person isn't recognized) and so no divorce is necessary. The same is true if a man gives his mother or daughter כסף קידושין...there's no need for a divorce because there is no effective marriage.
All of these sorts of halachic ideas, whether in regard to if a marriage or a succah is considered legitimate are merely halachic constructs. In other words, they don't exist outside of halacha. A marriage, in halacha, is only recognized if it is, and if it is not, social convention isn't enough.
I'd like to contrast that with how old someone is, and even stronger than that, how old someone is relative to another person. One cannot say that Adam is older than Brian if Brian is older than Adam. It's a non-negotiable reality of the universe. There's a celestial timestamp, and it's only for the sake of the preservation of the calendar system that such a wacky violation of math is accepted. A conflict arose and the halacha prioritized the calendar over math.
There is an example in מסכת סוכה of an eruv that is questionable, and deemed invalid. But this technical deficiency does not invalidate said construction for the purposes of a succah, and the talmud asks how this could be..."is it possible," the gemara asks incredulously, "that this could be a valid succah but you aren't permitted to walk on Shabbos four amos in this succah holding an item?" The conclusion is that on Shabbos of Succos, we accept this as a valid eruv, but not for the rest of the year.
The difference between these situations and the calendar, as I see it, is that an eruv and a succah and a marriage and a divorce are all strictly halachic entities. They don't exist outside of the halachic framework. But time exists outside of halacha. Math is real outside of halacha. And so to say that halacha claims that the younger boy is older than the older boy is a paradoxical assertion that I see as halacha conflicting with reality, in a way that halacha is not confronting reality in the examples of the kohen or the eruv above, because marriages and eruvin do not exist in reality, but are merely halachic constructs.
I'm sorry, but older in a halachic sense simply is not based on howany days ago you were born, rather how.mNy years you lived, with a year being defined with the halachic year, so objectively the younger one is older from a halachic perspective (it's not even a legal fiction, merely a set of principles)
Sorry, I hold that the halacha is koevya the metaphysical metzius
It seems that you are asserting that psak has the power to establish the halacha even when it's based on incorrect premises. Isn't this the classic case of בית דין שטעו?
And the tshuvos I referenced from the Rashba and the Maadanei Yom Tov (and in the famous dispute of the pachad yitzchak) they are very clear that it's because we trust chazal to be right, not because it doesn't matter.
Yes that's an issue.
Once a Sanhedrin is kovea, we need to follow. It might be a bes din shetau, in fact it likely is, but we need a Sanhedrin to determine that.
הוריות א ד ב"ד שהורו וידע יודע אחד מהן שטעו או אחד מהתלמידים וראוי להוראה והלך ועשה על פיהן חייב שלא עשה על פי בית דין. It's debatable whether we can be considered ראוי להוראה with regard to factual questions, but at least the rishonim and acharonim would seem to fit this category as chazal don't have the complete authority of Sanhedrin after Sanhedrin disbanded.
Additionally, on a factual question who's to say the concept of psak even exists when we know they were mistaken? Its like the Mishnah in yevamos where beis din is matir an ishah and her husband walks into beis din, where we don't allow her to get remarried until beis din intervenes, and if she knew about it she would be chayav (which is why she always is because she should have done her research).
And what about psakim from the rishonim which are mistaken (such as the Rosh about chametz among others)
Why do you maintain such a view?
Another interesting post. I notice a few interesting posts on your substack, I hope you don’t mind if I make some comments on each. Thanks again. Now for my response to this one.
"Rav Dessler offers a novel solution, but it's very difficult to accept. He claims that even when they gave their reasoning based on theןr scientific understanding, there are many reasons, and they knew the halacha b'mesorah, so although they may have been mistaken in the science, the halacha remains the same."
I would suggest that Rav Dessler's solution is not really novel, but is a basic realization that emerges from prolonged study of Gemara. It's clear that in many cases, the Amoraim didn't have a mesorah on the reasoning for the Mishnaic halacha, which is why they argue at length about the reasoning. One simple example out of hundreds is the first two daf of Beitzah, in which the Amoraim suggest at least four different possible reasons for the halacha that an egg is assur on Yom Tov, and discuss the various pros and cons of the reasons extensively. It's also clear that in many cases, even when the Gemara pasken like a certain reason, it still takes other possible reasons into account. One example is in the discussion on daf 18a in Beitzah, in the Maharshah's comments to Rashi and the Pnei Yehoshua, in which they explain that the Gemara always understood that there is an underlying issue of תיקון מנה when purifying a vessel on Yom Tov, but is nevertheless proposing other, more solid rationales for the prohibition.
One can ask, if this is the case, how can we ever use the reasons given in the Gemara, or our own reasoning, to pasken various cases in halacha in which those reasons would affect the outcome? Maybe our reason is incorrect? After all, we never know for sure? And the answer is that this is how halacha works. אין לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות. The Torah expects us to use our reasoning skills to pasken. However, it does not expect us to use our reasoning skills to *contradict* halachos that we received במסורה.
Therefore, in regards to the leniency of killing lice on Shabbos in which the Gemara gives a rationale that lice don't procreate, even if that reason is scientifically incorrect, it doesn't mean the halacha is incorrect or should be “updated”. I will offer two further rationales for why this halacha should not be “updated”.
1.Since the Torah was given to people without modern instruments, it is not reasonable to suppose that it would have required modern instruments to pasken, and that such halachos should change based on the revelations of modern instruments.
2. Moreover, when one contemplates the reason the Gemara gives, it begs for further explanation. Why would the lack of procreation mean that it is not considered נטילת נשמה? The Gemara says this is derived from אילים. But why would “procreation” be the defining feature of אילים for the purpose of melacha, rather than being, say, a big shaggy creature with four legs and two eyes? I think the obvious pshat is that lack of procreation means the creature is not an independent creature, but part of a person’s sweat (and the Rishonim use the words “אלא נולד מן הזיעה”). This can be understood as an absolute (incorrect) physical reality (and I would agree that the Amoraim probably truly believed this- even though in the Gemara there is a discussion if it really true), but at the same time it can also be understood as a halachic category, that the lice are considered part of a person’s sweat, and not an independent creature that שחיטה would apply to- and this is the category that matters more than the scientific one, and would not necessarily change based on modern scientific revelations.
However, none of this means that halacha is never updated. Indeed, there are hundreds, probably thousands of examples in which halacha was updated to align with contemporary circumstances, familiar to anybody who has studied halacha.
Lets talk about some other examples which are clearly dependent on the scientific reasoning. This includes the ancient belief that worms in fish originate from the fish's body, that babies born in the eighth month cannot survive, that there are two ducts in the male organ one for urine one for semen with a thin membrane between them that can burst, that a lactating woman's milk draws on the same resources as menstrual flow, the kinds of interruptions which can affect a womans period, or even the basic structure of female anatomy, whole lists of medical halachos on shabbos, and what about metzitzah by a bris (which was thought to be necessary to avoid infection), large sections of hilchos bliyos, most of the halachos of chimmutz etc. etc. etc. Do you seriously think that the detailed discussions in the gemara and the rishonim are not seriously attempting to ascertain the scientific reality and determine the halacha accordingly?
Sure, I think most of those cases fit in that paradigm. (Not all of them though.) For example, worms in fish- this is a halachic category and is related to insects born in fruit and in the water, whether they are פורש or not. It is not just a bare scientific question that that tangentially relates to halacha.
A lactating woman's milk draws on the same resources as menstrual flow- this is even easier because it is based on basic physical observation, that there is a correlation between lactation and menstruation. Even if they were wrong about the scientific mechanism, the halacha as relates to סילוק דם can still be correct. In Bechoros, it is discussing about a צריכותא in drashos, which doesn’t affect the halacha in the first place.
Babies born in the eighth month cannot survive is almost certainly based on actual observation and was not a belief unique to the Rabbis. I don’t think that all these cultures saw such babies commonly survive and just ignored that. This has nothing to do with paradigms of rationalism and empiricism, if such babies commonly survived, there wouldn’t have been such a belief.
Hilchos bliyos and chametz easily fit into this paradigm, more than everything else you mentioned. I think this is what the Rambam means in Hilchos chametz- אפילו לש קמח ארז וכיוצא בו ברותחין וכסהו בבגדים עד שנתפח כמו בצק שהחמיץ הרי זה מותר באכילה שאין זה חמוץ אלא סרחון. As for Bliyos, their pots were much more porous than ours and were certainly boleyah even without heat (which leads to the question, why aren’t these halachos updated for modern pots? I have heard that Rav Belsky used this as a סניף להקל. I think we will see more of this as time passes), and so is food. This is why the halacha of the Gemara is having a non-Jew test the taste. Because it worked. You can experiment yourself on food and easily confirm this. But the detailed requirements of heat and especially Kli Rishon are definitely halachic categories.
“Do you seriously think that the detailed discussions in the gemara and the rishonim are not seriously attempting to ascertain the scientific reality and determine the halacha accordingly?”
It doesn’t even remotely look like that from studying halacha. Yes, there was some empirical observation, and they knew how to look at things empirically when they felt necessary (I have a short list of such cases on one of my IM posts), but the vast majority is discussions of halachic categories, and that is what matters in halacha.
Ok, I think I understand your perspective better now. Thank you
Thanks for the comments! I haven't yet had a chance to respond to your comments on the other post or to this one I will try to get to it soon. Keep them coming!
Why do you think Rav Dessler’s approach that there are hidden reasons in chazal hard to accept?
We don't get such an impression from any reading of chazal themselves. They used logic, science, and other methods and were very transparent about their conclusions. Also, 'hidden reasons' seems difficult to imagine what they would be in most cases, unless you allow for kabbalistic reasons, which chazal clearly did not engage in, and even according to the modern charedi view that they did, it's still insufficeint grounds for a halachic ruling,
Isn’t saying that “chazal were very transparent” kind of begging the question since the claim at issue is whether they didn’t explain everything?
When you say that “hidden reasons” are hard to imagine. What do you mean? I usually think that imagination is not that difficult. People imagine lots of interesting things.
When you say kabbalistic reasons would be insufficient grounds according to modern charedi views, couldn’t a Rav Dessler proponent respond that it is insufficient by itself to establish a ruling but not insufficient to maintain a ruling once the primary reason fell away?
Also dont recorded chazal often says very little as to their actual intention behind reasoning as is evident by numerous explanations on Chazal explaining the deeper meanings of chazal? Even in Halacha, each source is abridged and needs a lot more to explain tonal full understanding. When the Mishima brurah explains the meaning of a ramma, he’s saying the ramma meant that but didn’t say it in a lot of words. The Gemara was intentionally left confusing according to some in order to allow for discussion and learning. So the idea of hidden reasons doesn’t seem foreign to me at all.
No, it's an empirical fact that halacha was established through a process of reasoning and debate, and we never find someone saying the halacha is x מטעם כמוס עמדי. Therefore, to postulate an entire underworld or reasoning which is completely absent from dialogue is highly contentious or even conspiratorial. It simply doesn't reflect what we do know, and it should be immediately striking as weak apologetics, and the direct answer is that they simply considered the reason they explicitly stated to be valid, as they were limited by the science of their times.
When I read a mishna, I can more often than not predict the kind of explanation the gemara will give, and even moreso for a halacha in the gemara one who's familiar with the process can usually predict how the rishonim will explain it. For the most part halacha is not a mysterious realm constantly filled with esoteric revelations. It might be cryptic for the moderm reader who is used to a particular style of fleshing out discussions, but within it's own framework it's largely comprehensible. There simply no room for a whole new dimension.
The idea that kabbala is insufficient grounds for halacha is in itself a halachic principle. I don't see why mantaining the status quo would be any different.
I’m surprised with your ability to predict so well. Have you not spent weeks in yeshiva trying to understand a R Chaim or Ketzos and having many different possibilities as to the meaning behind those words?
Oh for sure, don't get me wrong. Lomdus is complicated, but the possible heterim for killing lice on shabbos are very limited.
So I guess I’m not sure why you think there isn’t a lot of hidden reasons behind chazal if you agree that one sentence of an acharon can have a much deeper reasoning and multiple ways of interpreting it. I view that as “hidden” reasons that we wouldn’t necessarily understand by looking at the one sentence explanation as to why something is assur.
They write in many places אם קבלה הוא נקבל. They also edited the Talmud to get to a specific conclusion in a way that feels the conclusion is predetermined. (At least that's what Talmid academic scholars say).
If I'm understanding you correctly, you believe that the most plausible approach of all is that really halacha got it wrong, only that no rabbis were ever bold/aware enough to say so?
I strongly disagree with you, but I'll just interject now that Rav Dessler's approach is famously found already in the writings of the Ramchal, only when he said it had little to do with resolving the contradiction, rather as an innate and internal understanding of agados chazal in general. It so happens to answer the question beautifully. But this is obviously part a longer discussion which would probably get to the roots of our differences (especially in how we'd probably view the different movements of Jewish history).
The Ramchal (I'm assuming you are referring to מאמר על ההגדות) does not say anything regarding halachic statements, he only addresses aggodos chazal and introduces the concepts of mashal u'mlitzah as appropriate for those contexts.
Of course if you come with an a priori that the mesorah is justified one can find all kinds of answers (such as rav dessler's who to an outsider clearly seems like weak apologetics, although it fits well with the quasi-chassidic narratvie throughout his writings). I am approaching it as a historical question, and I think the sharp dichotomy I presented leads us pretty strongly to the conclusion I drew. (See my post on deconstruction)
elsewhere he talks about halachic statements as well; see for example adir bamarom pg. 236.
but this comment is a big one. as you pointed out in the previous post, the first question is, what is the starting point? am i an atheist until judaism is proven, or am i reasonable to assume judaism is true until you disprove it. if you start with the former, we can probably still get there eventually but it will take much longer, but either way you can grant me the freedom that if i can use a certain theory of explaining the world from a source based ontological standpoint within judaism which answers the questions of science, the fact that to an outsider (who is ignorant of what he is arguing against in the first place) it may seem strange is hardly my problem.
for example, the reb dessler (ramchal) approach, if i can assert some pretty based jewish axioms from early and numerous sources with ontologically sound reasoning, and from those reasonable axioms the questions of science are answered by the bye, while this won't positively prove any of judaism's claims, it will ease up the tension from those questions which put judaism on trial to begin with.
case in point: assuming there is a God, the abrahamic monotheistic type, and we delve into the character of what such a God would entail did He exist, we would (pretty quickly- we can work it out separately) conclude that the One who created everything ex-nihilo is necessary for its constant maintenance. this has been made extra famous in the yeshiva world by the nefesh hachaim's comparison between a creation by God (i.e. ex-nihilo) and a carpenter's creation (ex-materia) that after the carpenter leaves the scene, the building still stands. but it's pretty much the standard approach throughout both jewish works and christian and muslim theologians. in jewish works, the rambam, ramban, ralbag, rav chisdai crescas, the ikkarim and of course the arizal and anyone after him all either alude to this or say it straight out. in non-jewish works, aquinas was probably the most famous to discuss this, but plotinus, augustine, avicenna, ansalem, avveroes and al farabi pretty much all converge on this topic (although technically al farabi and avveroes can be misconstrued, the best reading is as we said above). i don't know if there are any religious contestors to this idea until pretty recently (by people who know little about ontology), including reb saadia gaon who has been quoted wrongly (by those same poeple) as disagreeing; while he doesn't ever actually espouse this view super clearly, there's definitely nothing that i know of that he says which diverges from this notion. the only people who clearly argued were aristotle and aristotilean die-hards (or other later pantheists like spinoza) who believed the universe existed forever as a necessary manifestation of God's perfection, but those who believe in creation pretty much agree on this. if i ever get down to turning this into a book or at least a series of posts, i'll devote a chapter on this and its sources and ensuing debates. but point is that all religious philosopher believers seem to agree on this point -- and the reason is obvious; nothing "needs" to be if it wasn't aways.
now given that this is the case, science as we know it, the system of how physicality works, is really nothing more than the workings of an illusion of permanence. if you think you can swallow the previous notion and not this, think again; this is basically a definitional result of that. this second step makes a lot of modern believers (creationists in whatever form you wish that to mean, including a 14 billion yr old version) very uncomfortable because it sounds like we're saying science isn't real (which is kinda true!) but at the same time, that is absolutely *not* what we're saying. in fact, if you follow this thought process through, all it does is change what we mean when we talk about science. from this perspective, science is the workings of a system within the framework of a world that was created, which is, in a sense, not the way it *really* works. acc. to this worldview, science isn't a necessary entity and the laws can be changed by Him at any moment, but! He *did* create laws and *doesn't* change them, חק נתן ולא יעבור. so in that sense science is very real and we can swear by it and be proud of ourselves as mankind for discovering etc. only that this into can really do wonders to begin the process of explaining the contradiction of science and the ancient way of understanding; there are in fact two simultaneous realities at play and they, in a sense, don't work together.
there is a whole lot more to this thesis, even in just the legwork process, such as understanding what the ancients were doing (which probably needs further legwork in it's own right especially to a generation which thinks they were a bunch of foolish superstitious ignoramuses trying to understand things out of nothing) but this is an excellent place to start imo.
looking forward to your response, sorry for my delay
I am preparing a series of posts on theistic and atheistic arguments, and I plan on addressing these points with a decent amount of thoroughness, but for the time being my posts will focus more on either the psychology of frum belief or theological and historical analyses of Judaism, as I want to set the tone of this blog to be a uniquely Jewish discussion and not a general discussion of theism which includes many Christian and Muslim sources as well.
With regard to your point about an outsider, I am currently at the point that I view Judaism as an outsider but I am intimately aware of the inside view as well. There are many scholars as well who are well aware of frum theology who do not accept the claims. With regard to Rav desslers claim, I find it as logical as the example I discussed in earlier post about the assumption of Mary, that within a Christian paradigm it's very logical but as an outsider who does not a priori except the assumptions of Catholicism *and* view his theological speculations (?) as having a privilege status about the ontological nature of the universe of the claim itself is rather weak.
It might come across as sarcasm, but the fact that all of chazal presuppose the existence of the supernatural makes for the greatest error of all.
that's really irrelevant to the theological discussion at hand
>>>when discussing the issue of chazal and science, most rishonim and acharonim have been of the opinion that chazal used the contemporary science available to them, but had no special knowledge of the 'secrets of the torah' which gave them superior knowledge than the Greeks or contemporary science.
While it might be of no use to comment on while in the discussion, I don't think it's irrelevant. You write that "chazal use the science available to them," but the rabbis of today do not. They promote religious law and life with complete disregard to science, a single word that can perhaps be best abbreviated as "the best method of pursuing truth." Science, with its open debate, peer review and double-blind methods, is designed to circumvent the mind traps that humans are so apt to fall into, and it shows us there are no good reasons to presume religion to be true. Those who promote religion, with the rabbis at the front and chazal in their minds and their books, are ignoring these critical concerns.
For sure, Judaism is less fake than Christianity, so kudos to Ramban in Barcelona, but that's only to say that more things have to have been made up for Christianity to be true. Sort of like Sam Harris' comments about how Mormonism is objectively more ridiculous than mainstream Christianity. But where is the consideration of Orthodoxy and its members that they are praying to thin air, or even an address to the potential that they might be?
All of what your saying is true only if there is no metaphysical reality, which is not science based
If the idea that there's a metaphysical reality is proposed without evidence, it can similarly be rejected without evidence.
This then becomes a more mature version of "well, my daddy can beat you up" vs "no, my daddy can beat YOU up!" although not that much mature.
It certainly seems that you think this comment is way more profound than it really is. You'd never think to say, "I may not have any evidence that there's a monster under my bed, but that's only in physical reality. Metaphysically, though, we know he's there and Rambam agrees with me."
Do you not see how this amounts to special pleading?
The problem is that mysticism has been rediscovered thousands of times by thousands of religions. And they all have relatively similar paths how to achieve a mystical experience. There is evidence if you want to try it out. You have never even attempted to. Such overwhelming agreement of a supposed imaginary realm implies it's real . The denier of mysticism here is the one putting his fingers in his ears and yelling "lalala I can't hear you".
See this comment where i reply to that point. https://open.substack.com/pub/simonfurst/p/chazal-halakha-and-science?r=45kjth&utm_campaign=comment-list-share-cta&utm_medium=web&comments=true&commentId=69988482
I don't see that as a problem any more than astrology having played a role in so many cultures, but we are confident to reject it completely today. So many cultures studied the relative and supposed "movements" of the stars, and the movement of the planets against the stars, and named constellations after they fabricated constellations. Then they explained how these bodies possess and exert special powers over those born at different times of years when each contrived group of stars rise first in the morning of that month.
Does this make astrology true? There is bad evidence that it's true, because the lady down the block is a Pisces and she got divorced and her husband was a Libra...big surprise, right?
>>>You have never even attempted to.
Have you attempted to rid yourself of sin by visiting the Zoroastrian fire temple? Have you spent even 5 minutes of your life worrying about how your actions have not comported with what the Hadith demands of you? Or do you not even know Sura 15 from Sura 23? You likely don't give a damn and never will because it's just stupidity made up thousands of years ago by gullible people who didn't know that disease came from germs. They thought it came from sin. How silly of them.
I won't even bother asking you if you've attempted to get audited by a Scientologist officer, to see if you are fit to join the Sea Org. Tom Cruise does his own stunts and John Travolta is a very good dancer...but are you saying they're just so stupid as to think that this nonsense could be real?! Obviously there's something there...no?
>>>Such overwhelming agreement of a supposed imaginary realm implies it's real.
There are 1,800,000,000 Muslims and 1,300,000,000 Catholics. Please let me know when you convert to either one because of the overwhelming agreement of these "supposedly imaginary" deities and his rules and regulations, and then explain why you didn't convert to the other one, please.
It seems that the only wise thing to do is deny mysticism, for embracing it brings you no closer to the truth without something else, and as we don't have anything else, all you have is the mysticism. So if you prefer sitting on rugs and humming instead of watching hockey, fine by me. But please don't make assertions without evidence and ask anyone to respect your silly ideas. As Hitchens had iterated so succinctly, I respect you too much to respect your silly ideas.
If you want to go the Dawkins Harris route and compare God to monsters under the bed and flying spaghetti sauce teapots, be my guest. The fact that you don't understand something doesn't make it less profound. You should try orchos tzadikim, moreh or even plato and Aquinas before dismissing them entirely with your "I've never seen them (I imagine you didn't put in quite the effort they did) so they don't exist attitude".
You probably think these are good arguments for your position, but they are not. To suggest that someone who asks for evidence of god should read ארחות צדיקים is to say that you have no good reasons AND you are accusing the antagonist is the discussion (me, among others) of being arrogant and ignorant.
You are an atheist in regard to all the thousands of gods you don't believe in, and you likely spend no time worrying about all the punishments and hells and damnation that these gods promise you for your lack of obedience, and the response to you from priests and shamans of these silly, made-up religions shouldn't be, "you think my eagle god don't exist and you mock their teachings, but only because you haven't studied enough. Go and learn about Nanu the raven and Mohklat the bear and you will be humbled."
Before making any arguments for Judaism, take the argument and change "Hashem" to "Eagle God" and change "Moses" to "Leetu the Ancient" and change "Rabbi Dessler" to "Junkta the wise elder" and see if these arguments would be convincing to you. If not, then your argument isn't a good one.
"(There are contemporary places that have tried to update Halacha, such as Machon Shilo and Machon Hadar. But nobody takes them seriously and eats in their house and davens in their shuls.)"
I don't know what Machon Hadar is but you are mistaken regarding Machon Shilo. Machon Shilo does not update Halacha. It attempts revive Torat Eretz Yisrael in the Land of Israel which was the original halacha which had been perverted and distorted in the exile due to foreign influences and historical and sociological realities. Nothing to do with updating, rather the opposite-returning the original, pristine Torah of Eretz Yisrael. And "(nobody takes them seriously and eats in their house and davens in their shuls.)" I would delete that for your sake.
You just described updating halacha just in different words. I'll keep it in.
No, it's undoing an update.
"and in the contemporary brisker approach to lomdus"
Can you elaborate?
The brisker method is built on seeing dinim as a reality which is 'chal' and changes the ontological nature of the item in question. For a brisker, halachos aren't simply rules, they are 'things'.
I always thought of it as legal principles, not ontological metzius
You should read more RYBS, Ash. Mr. Furst is 100% right.
Any specific source? Thanks
Well there are the classics: Halachic Man and Halachic mind. I highly recommend this essay by his grandson Rabbi Mayer Twersky as an introduction to the whole shebang:
https://jewishaction.com/the-rav/towards-philosophy-halachah/
It's lengthy but worth the time. To get to the point, here is one important quote which directly underscores Mr. Furst's astute observation:
"General philosophy deals with basic questions regarding time, space, causality, et cetera—the basic, axiomatic categories of human thought and experience. What is time? Does it independently exist or is it just a descriptive category of measurement—(e.g., is it an hour’s drive?) If time exists, is it homogenous or heterogeneous? Similarly, space, causality and other basic categories invite the same scrutiny.
Religious philosophy investigates the assumptions, axioms and underlying principles of man’s relationship with God. What relationship exists between God who is infinite, eternal and absolutely self-sufficient and man who is finite, mortal and dependent? The nature of religious experience and related issues are scrutinized.
Halachah, according to the Rav, addresses the domains of both religious and general philosophy. First of all, halachic principles can illumine the nature of man’s relationship with God. The second element of the Rav’s thesis is even more remarkable–basic philosophical ideas and religious experiences regarding space, time and causality are objectified within halachah.
Halachah, according to the Rav, is not simply a legal system but also an objectified philosophical system. Within halachah, fundamental philosophical concepts and religious experiences have been translated into halachic norms.12"
How would you answer Furst's critique then? Or do you actually agree there's something fundamentally wrong with the halachic system?